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I. INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that many consumers who need legal services do not
have access to legal services.1 In fact, the legal community has grappled with
this access issue for over a century.2 In the past 50 years, legal services have
*

A 2014 graduate of Hamline University School of Law now clerking for the
Honorable Judge Rodenberg at the Minnesota Court of Appeals. A special thanks to Professor
Jill Barclift for her patience and support through this process. And to the staff of the Hamline
Law Review—I know how much care and dedication they put into this article and for that I
am grateful.
1
See infra text accompanying notes 130–133.
2
See infra text accompanying notes 103–129.

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2015

1

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 38 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 2

32

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:31

been allocated to the very wealthy and the very poor, and almost entirely out
of reach for all those in between.3 Enter LegalZoom: a slick, user friendly
alternative to traditional face-to-face legal services. 4 LegalZoom provides
low- and middle-income consumers an option to easily start and run a
business, minimally protect themselves and their families, and perform other
routine legal services that would otherwise be economically unattainable. 5
However, LegalZoom has other, nonmonetary costs.6 In most jurisdictions,
LegalZoom is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and does not
provide the amount of confidentiality to its customers that is ordinarily
required of those practicing law. 7 While harms are possible, many harms
could be avoided through regulation of LegalZoom’s services by state bar
associations and supreme courts.8
The following will argue that despite LegalZoom’s shortfalls, the
legal community, due to its inability to provide access to all who need it, is
ethically obligated to pass regulations which allow LegalZoom to continue.
Part III.A provides an overview of the services LegalZoom provides and a
brief history of the company. Part III.B discusses the ongoing litigation in
which LegalZoom is entangled. Part III.C explains how unauthorized
practice statutes and attorney client privilege pose problems to LegalZoom’s
services, and whether or not there is actually cause for alarm. In Part IV.A
the history of the legal community’s struggle to provide cost-effective
services to all those in need is explained, along with the current state of legal
services in Part IV.B. Part IV.C discusses the vacuum created by the
availability of legal services to the very rich and the very poor, and some
possible causes for the high costs of legal services driving the enlargement of
this vacuum. Finally, in Part V, the following explains why it is ethically
incumbent upon the legal community to pass regulations so that LegalZoom
may continue to provide services to underrepresented populations while still
protecting consumer interests.
II. THE ONLINE FORM PROVIDER
LegalZoom is not the first online legal form provider, but it has been
the most successful. 9 The following sections will explore LegalZoom’s
services, explain LegalZoom’s legal troubles, and analyze the potential
harms associated with the company’s services

3

See infra text accompanying notes 103–129.
See infra text accompanying notes 10–20.
5
See infra text accompanying notes 15–25.
6
See infra text accompanying notes 65–76, 89–96.
7
See infra text accompanying notes 65–76, 89–96.
8
See infra text accompanying notes 176–180.
9
See Lindzey Schindler, Skirting the Ethical Line: The Quandary of Online
Legal Forms, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 185, 186 (2012).
4
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A. The Service
Brian Lee and Brian Liu founded LegalZoom in 2001 after leaving
corporate law practice. 10 The vision was to create an easy, cost-effective
service for consumers so that they may jettison the traditional model of faceto-face legal services. 11 LegalZoom allows customers to create a will,
incorporate a business, file for bankruptcy and divorce, designate power of
attorney, and even change their name, along with “other common legal
matters.”12 No matter which legal service is requested, LegalZoom promises
to fulfill customers’ requests in three steps: after logging in the customer (1)
answers a series of questions specific to the legal document requested, (2)
LegalZoom “assistants” (i.e., nonlawyers) review the customer’s answers for
“consistency and completeness,” contacting the customer only if
“clarification or additional information” is needed, and (3) LegalZoom prints
the legal document requested and mails the document along with “simple
wrap-up instructions” to the customer. 13 Through this process LegalZoom
guarantees the customer 100% satisfaction.14
In addition to LegalZoom’s document preparation service, the
company also offers Business Legal Plans and Personal Legal Plans
beginning at $23.99/month and $11.99/month, respectively.15 These plans are
subscription services, which allow a user to choose an attorney in the
appropriate state and consult with said attorney on legal matters for 30
minutes at no cost. 16 Each time a subscriber initiates a 30-minute
consultation they must have a new, unique legal issue. 17 The subscription
also includes an “annual checkup,” which LegalZoom prescribes is limited to

10

Daniel Fisher, Entrepreneurs Versus Lawyers, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2011, 6:00
PM),
www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/1024/entrepreneurs-lawyers-suh-legalzoom-automatedaniel-fisher.html [hereinafter Entrepreneurs].
11
About Us, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/about_us.html (last visited
Sept. 3, 2014).
12
Id. (emphasis added).
13
How it Works, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/about-us/how-itworks (last visited Sept. 3, 2014).
14
See LegalZoom—Easier and Affordable Way to Take Care of Legal Matters,
YOUTUBE, (Sept. 11, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1xHweul84w. See also Our
Satisfaction Guarantee, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/satisfaction-guarantee.html
(last visited Dec. 12, 2014).
15
See Legal Plans—Business, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com
/attorneys-lawyers/legal-plans/business (last visited Sept. 3, 2014); see also Legal Plans –
Personal, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/attorneys-lawyers/legal-plans/personal
(last visited Sept. 3, 2014). See generally LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com (last
visited Sept. 3, 2014).
16
See Legal Plans—Business., supra note 15. See also Legal Plans—Personal,
supra note 15.
17
See Legal Plans—Business., supra note 15. See also Legal Plans—Personal,
supra note 15.
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one hour.18 The Business Legal Plan provides for an “Attorney-drafted letter
on your behalf” of up to two pages, free legal document review for legal
documents under ten pages, a 10% discount on any LegalZoom legal
document (including personal forms), the registration of one copyright per
month, and a 25% discount on any service provided by the subscribers’
LegalZoom attorney that is above-and-beyond the services provided by the
plan. 19 The Personal Legal Plan allows for the same benefits, save those
relating specifically to business.20
The service appears to be popular with consumers. In 2011,
LegalZoom recorded revenues of just over $150 million, with a net income
of approximately $12 million. 21 In the 12 years LegalZoom has been in
business, the company boasts two million business and personal users.22 In
fact, in 2011, LegalZoom filed for an initial public offering (IPO) which
valued the company at over $480 million.23 Although LegalZoom has since
delayed its IPO (a result of discouraging market conditions), LegalZoom’s
revenues continue to rise.24 With wills costing just $6925 and trusts priced at
as little as $24926, it is understandable why consumers are flocking to this
web-based alternative.
B. The Litigation
Success is not without consequence. In 2010, LegalZoom faced legal
challenges from Missouri residents and the Washington State Attorney
General’s office. 27 In 2011, lawyers from the DeKalb County Bar
Association of Alabama sued LegalZoom, asking the court to enjoin

18

See Legal Plans—Business., supra note 15. See also Legal Plans—Personal,

supra note 15.
19

See Legal Plan—Business, supra note 15.
See id.
21
Tomio Geron, LegalZoom Files for IPO of Up To $120 Million, FORBES (May
11, 2012, 4:15 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/05/11/legalzoom-files-for-ipo/.
22
Home page, LEGALZOOM, www.legalzoom.com, (last visited Sept. 3, 2014).
23
Debra Cassens Weiss, LegalZoom Valued at 40 Times Last Year’s Earnings for
IPO, ABA JOURNAL (July 25, 2012, 9:38 AM) www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_
valued_at_40_times_last_years_earnings_for_ipo/.
24
Reynolds Holding &Antony Currie, Do-It-Yourself Law Firm IPO Looks a Bit
Too Feisty, SLATE (Jul. 24, 2012) http://www.slate.com/blogs/breakingviews/2012/07/24/
do_it_yourself_ law_firm_ipo_looks_a_bit_too_feisty_.html (noting a 43% improvement in
first quarter earnings in 2012).
25
Last Will & Testament, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/legalwills/wills-overview.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
26
Living Trust, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/living-trusts/livingtrusts-overview.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
27
See generally Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 727 F.Supp.2d 782 (W.D. Mo.
2010). See also Washington Attorney General zooms in on LegalZoom’s claims, WASHINGTON
STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sept. 16, 2010), www.atg.wa.gov/
pressrelease.aspx?id=26466#.UpqghaXGcig [hereinafter Washington Attorney General].
20
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LegalZoom from continuing business.28 In 2012, LegalZoom’s services were
challenged by the North Carolina State Bar and a resident of Ohio.29 Finally,
in 2013, class actions against LegalZoom were filed in both Texas and
Arkansas.30 LegalZoom reported a $5.4 million loss related to the company’s
legal settlements on their initial public offering.31 Most of the cases brought
against LegalZoom allege that the company is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.32
One of the first lawsuits brought against LegalZoom in 2010, Janson
v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., resulted in the district court’s denial of
LegalZoom’s motion for summary judgment.32 The Missouri court explained
that LegalZoom’s services “go beyond self-help” and “affect secular
rights.” 33 The Janson case involved a class action suit brought by Todd
Janson, Gerald Ardrey, Chad Ferrell, and C&J Remodeling. 34 The only
discernible harm to the plaintiffs in the Janson case was the money spent for
documents prepared unlawfully by an unlicensed entity.35 But, as critics of
the lawsuit note, the plaintiffs in Janson did not allege that the services
provided by LegalZoom—i.e., the documents prepared—were in any way
inadequate.36 In denying LegalZoom’s motion for summary judgment, the
court distinguished LegalZoom’s document preparation from legally
approved “self-help” kits, calling the former a “legal document preparation
service,” which constitutes practicing law, and the latter a mere “good[]”, the
sale of which does not constitute practicing law.37 The court found that the
practice of law by LegalZoom creates a “clear risk of the public being served
in legal matters by incompetent or unreliable persons.”38 Finding “little or no
28

See generally Stephanie Rabiner, LegalZoom Sued by Alabama Bar Group for
Unauthorized Practice, FINDLAW, (July 20, 2011, 5:44 AM), www.blogs.findlaw.com
/strategist/2011/07/legalzoom-sued-by-alabama-bar-group-forunauthorized-practice.html).
29
See generally LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111,
2012 WL 3678650 (N.C. Super. August 27, 2012). See also generally Lowry v.
LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 4:11CV02259, 2012 WL 2953109 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 2012).
30
See generally Solotko v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 03-10-00755-CV, 2013
WL 3724770 (Tex. App. 2013) (denying class certification requirements were met by
plaintiff). See also generally LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. McIllwain, 429 S.W.3d 261 (2013).
31
See LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 7, n. 1 (May 10,
2012).
32
See Washington Attorney General, supra note 27. See also LegalZoom Sued by
Alabama Bar, supra note 28; N.C. State Bar, 2012 WL 3678650 at *1; Lowry, 2012 WL
2953109 at *1; McIllwain, 429 S.W.3d at 262. See generally Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc.,
802 F.Supp.2d 1053 (W.D. Mo. 2011).
33
Id. at 1064, 1069.
34
Janson Compl. ¶¶ 1–3, Jan. 15, 2010, available at http://ipwatchdogs.com
/cases/janson_v_legalzoom_complaint.pdf.
35
Janson Compl. ¶¶ 23–25.
36
Daniel Fisher, Missouri Lawyers Sue to Block Online Competition, FORBES
(May 13, 2011), www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/05/13/missouri-lawyers-sue-toblock-online-competition/.
37
Janson, 802 F.Supp.2d at 1064.
38
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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difference” between LegalZoom and a practicing attorney, the court denied
LegalZoom’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to go
forward.39 LegalZoom quickly settled.40
LegalZoom’s legal woes did not end after its settlement in Janson.
Under LegalZoom’s settlement with the Washington State Attorney
General’s office, the company submitted an Assurance of Discontinuance.
The Assurance guaranteed, among other things, the site would no longer
compare its costs to the costs of a licensed attorney without also providing a
disclosure that LegalZoom’s services are not a substitute for an attorney’s or
a law firm’s services.41 In 2007, the North Carolina State Bar issued a Cease
and Desist letter to LegalZoom.42 LegalZoom did not cease and desist,
however, and in November of 2010, LegalZoom attempted to register its
services with the North Carolina Bar. 42 Taking issue specifically with
LegalZoom’s prepaid legal services, the North Carolina Bar denied
registration.43 When LegalZoom sought a declaratory judgment prescribing
that LegalZoom is not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in North
Carolina, the court refused to rule on the issue, holding that the facts were
not ripe enough to issue declaratory relief.44 While LegalZoom continues to
offer its document services in North Carolina, the company is still proscribed
from offering prepaid legal plans in that state.45 With the Arkansas Supreme
Court compelling arbitration of the class claims against LegalZoom,
litigation over whether LegalZoom is engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law in that state continues.46
39

Id. at 1065, 1069.
Debra Cassens Weiss, LegalZoom Can Continue to Offer Documents in
Missouri Under Proposed Settlement, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 23, 2011), www.abajournal.
com/news/article/legalzoom_can_continue_to_offer_documents_in_missouri_under_proposed
_settle/ (settling a mere 21 days after the Missouri court’s denial for summary judgment).
41
See generally Washington Attorney General, supra note 26. See also Def.’s
Assurance of Discontinuance ¶2.1(a), Sept. 15, 2010, available at www.atg.wa.gov
/uploadedFiles/Home/News/Press_Releases/2010/LegalZoomAOD.pdf.
42
N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2012 WL 3678650 at *2 (N.C. Super. Aug.
27, 2012).
42
Id. at *3.
43
Id.
44
Id. at *6.
45
See generally www.legalzoom.com/attorneys-lawyers/legal-plans/business.
html (the author attempted to register for a prepaid Business Legal Plan in North Carolina and
was met with an error message stating “We’re sorry! Business Advantage Pro is not currently
available in the state you selected”).
46
McIllwain, 429 S.W.3d at 266 (“while we confess that it is tempting to say that
our authority to regulate the practice of law, granted to us by the Arkansas Constitution,
empowers us to reserve the questions regarding the unauthorized practice of law for the courts
of this state over which we have a superintending authority, we are chastened by the
awareness of our duty to defer to the Supreme Court of the United States on matters of federal
statutory interpretation” and therefore the FAA controls and compels arbitration to decide
whether or not LegalZoom is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law). But see id.
(“Whether the contract mentioned in the underlying case contains only one, or even a dozen
arbitration clauses, is irrelevant to the issue presented because the contract is wholly irrelevant
40
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There remains, however, some hope for LegalZoom. The lawsuit in
2011 brought by E. Allen Dodd, a lawyer in Alabama, resulted in a
dismissal. 47 The Alabama court ruled that LegalZoom could continue its
services in Alabama, and the Alabama Bar refused to intervene to make the
case that LegalZoom was practicing law unlawfully. 48 The Alabama Bar’s
refusal to act, and the court’s refusal to hold that LegalZoom is engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law, would seem to suggest that Alabama laws
do not prohibit LegalZoom’s continued operation in that state. 49
Additionally, although no ruling on the merits has come from the class action
brought against LegalZoom in Texas, Texas courts are likely to hold that
LegalZoom is not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.50 In addition
to state support of this online legal alternative, many legal academics support
LegalZoom and similar services, and other regulatory branches support
relaxed rules to allow services like LegalZoom to exist.51
C. The Possibility & the Problems
The possibilities available for consumers if LegalZoom is accepted
in all 50 states are clear: affordable, efficient, and user-friendly legal
services.52 However, LegalZoom’s forms and services are not perfect. In fact,
to the question of whether LegalZoom has engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law...nothing in the FAA preempts the courts from carrying out their duties to regulate the
practice of law”) (Hannah, C.J., dissenting).
47
Chas Rampenthal, Alabama Lawsuit Against LegalZoom Dismissed,
GLOBENEWSWIRE (Feb. 1, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2011/02
/01/438943/212411/en/Alabama-Lawsuit-Against-LegalZoomDismissed.html (citing www.
legalzoom.com).
48
See generally Pl.’s Pet. Writ of Mandamus, No. 1091717, 2010 WL 4234944 at
*1.
49
See generally Rampenthal, supra note 47; see also supra note 48.
50
In 1999, a Texas district court heard a challenge to Parsons Technology, Inc.’s
Quicken Family Lawyer Software that claimed the software was engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law. See Schindler, supra note 9, at 186. Although the district court ruled that the
software was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, the Texas legislature subsequently
passed legislation overturning the court’s decision. Id. The unauthorized practice of law
statute in Texas now excludes websites, books, and software programs which “clearly and
conspicuously” state that the resources are not a “substitute for the advice of a lawyer.” Id.
(citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81.101 (2011)). LegalZoom will likely fall under this
exclusion, depending on how the court defines “conspicuously,” if the court is asked to do so.
When accessing the Business Legal Plan (described in Part III.A supra), a customer that
chooses Texas is provided language stating “[w]e are not a law firm or a substitute for an
attorney or law firm” at the bottom of the page in fine print–seemingly bringing LegalZoom
within the exclusion set-out by the Texas legislature.
51
See Cristina L. Underwood, Balancing Consumer Interests in a Digital Age: A
New Approach to Regulating the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 437, 445
(2004) (“The Federal Trade Commission has… criticized state use of broad practice of law
definitions for… failure to accommodate access to emerging technologies”).
52
See Isaac Figueras, The LegalZoom Identity Crisis: Legal Form Provider or
Lawyer in Sheep’s Clothing?, 63 CASE W. RES. 1419, 1429 (2013) (stating “[i]f LegalZoom’s
business model survives, then this could be a significant step towards the commoditization of
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LegalZoom disclaims a guarantee that any form or service is “correct,
complete[,] or up-to-date.” 53 Thus, there is tension between possible
advances in the commoditization of law and the quality of services that
commodity provides. Below is an exploration of two of the most common
issues with LegalZoom, and whether or not the academic alarm over these
issues is warranted.
1. Practice of Law
As mentioned above in Part III.B, most litigation brought against
LegalZoom revolves around claims that LegalZoom is engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law. Further, LegalZoom itself recognizes the threat
unauthorized practice laws imposes to the success of its business, positioning
this concern first in a list of “Risks Relating to Our Business” in its 2012
SEC IPO filing.54 The definition of what is the practice of law varies from
state to state.55 In addition to non-uniformity among states, attempts to define
“the practice of law” have historically been fruitless.56 Generally, the practice
of law is marked by an exercise of professional judgment by a trained
lawyer.57 This professional judgment is exercised when an attorney uses her
ability to analyze a specific legal issue by applying “the general body and
philosophy of law.”58 The general purpose of unauthorized practice statutes
is to protect consumers. 59 Regulating who may practice law protects
consumers because a license ensures that the practitioner has the education

law… [t]his provides many advantages to consumers who were previously unable to access
affordable, customized legal services”). See, e.g., Mathew Rotenberg, Stifled Justice: The
Unauthorized Practice of Law and Internet Legal Resources, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709, 720
(2012) (asserting that “[c]onsumers are benefiting [from LegalZoom] as well, using these
products as affordable alternatives to hiring an attorney”).
53
Terms of Use, LEGALZOOM, www.legalzoom.com/legal/general-terms/termsof-use (stating “LegalZoom strives to keep its legal documents accurate, current and up-todate. However, because the law changes rapidly, LegalZoom cannot guarantee that all of the
information on the Site or Applications is completely current. The law is different from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and may be subject to interpretation by different courts. [. . .] [T]he
legal information contained on the Site and Applications . . . is not guaranteed to be correct,
complete or up-to-date”).
54
See LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 11 (May 10,
2012).
55
See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5 cmt. 1 (2013).
56
See Catherine Lanctot, Conference on Legal Ethics: “What Needs Fixing?”:
Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document Preparation and the Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 811 (2012) (stating “lawyers have famously struggled for
decades to define what it is that they do for a living… it is the amorphous nature of the
practice of law that makes inquiries into unauthorized practice principles so challenging”).
57
Id.
58
Id. (citing Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility EC 3-5 (1982)).
59
See Rotenberg, supra note 52 at 714. See also Schindler, supra note 10, at 439.
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and ability to grapple with complex legal issues and provides a means of
meeting consumer expectations of effective legal service.60
Many believe LegalZoom is engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.61 Instead of simply providing blank forms with instructions, LegalZoom
makes determinations about which form best suits the needs of the consumer
based on the consumer’s answers to a questionnaire.62 LegalZoom also drafts
legal documents which include information deemed necessary by its
algorithms.63 For example, when a business owner is debating which type of
legal entity to form, LegalZoom provides an online questionnaire which,
after answering a few basic questions about the future business, allows the
consumer to “choos[e] the right business structure.” 64 This advice giving
function, and parallel form-choosing function, brings LegalZoom into
traditional “practice of law” territory.65
The concerns deriving from a nonlawyer practicing law are varied.
First, lay consumers may not be capable of determining which form best
suits their needs, or if the form selected by LegalZoom best fits their needs.66
This means that lay consumers may be saddled with a product that is
inadequate for, or actually harms, the consumer’s interest—an issue that is
normally addressed through regulations ensuring those practicing law are
adequately trained to provide sufficient solutions to legal issues.67

60

See Underwood, supra note 51, at 440. Underwood also discusses that license
requirements allow for confidentiality when an attorney-client relationship is formed, but this
fact will be discussed in the next section.
61
See supra, Part II.B.
62
See Janson, 802 F.Supp.2d at 1055–57. See also How It Works, LEGALZOOM,
https://www.legalzoom.com/about-us/how-it-works (last visited Sept. 3, 2014).
63
See How It Works, supra note 62.
64
See Starting Your Business, Get Help, LEGALZOOM, www.legalzoom.com/
business/guide_intro.html.
65
See Lanctot, supra note 56, at 849 (“the courts have consistently taken the
position that selecting which form to use, giving advice about which information ought to be
included in a form, or soliciting information from a lay person and then making
determinations about how to use the information in the form is the equivalent of practicing
law”). See also Figueras, supra note 52, at 1426 (stating “the customization of forms for
customers and review of their documents for inconsistencies could push LegalZoom into the
role of a document preparer and therefore into the practice of law”) and at 1438 (asserting
“[e]ven if the clauses that end up in these forms are written beforehand by attorneys, the fact
that LegalZoom’s program selects which clauses go in the form supports the argument that
this constitutes providing legal advice [a form of practicing law]”); Janson, 802 F.Supp.2d at
1065 (“[a] computer sitting at a desk in California cannot prepare a legal document without a
human programming it to fill in the document using legal principles that are derived from…
law that are selected for the customer based on the information provided by the customer…
there is little or no difference between this and a lawyer… asking a client a series of questions
and then preparing a legal document based on the answers provided and applicable… law”).
66
See Lanctot, supra note 56, at 821.
67
See id. at 848, 854 (“[t]he forms may be outdated or not suitable for use for a
particular set of facts… [t]here is no follow-up to ensure that the appropriate documents were
used, or whether additional assistance was necessary”).
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Second, because of LegalZoom’s proclamations about guaranteed
satisfaction and “personalized, affordable legal protection” consumers may
be lulled into a false sense of security after purchasing documents or
services. 68 Even if consumers have read LegalZoom’s disclaimer and
understand that the forms and services on the site may not be accurate,
consumers are still likely to believe that LegalZoom’s documents and
services are “prepared with a minimal level of competence and care.”69 It is
hard to reconcile consumer expectations of a “minimal level of competence
and care” provided by LegalZoom’s own guarantee of quality and
“affordable legal protection” with LegalZoom’s repudiation of completeness
or correctness relating to its forms and services. 70 In light of the tension
between what LegalZoom guarantees and what it actually provides—along
with the understanding that consumers generally do not read disclaimers—
the legal community’s concern is that consumers are relying on unreliable
legal services to their detriment. 71 If nonlawyers are prohibited from
providing such services, then consumers are generally justified in relying on
such services because they are only provided by licensed practitioners.
Finally, consumers have no recourse in the worst case scenario—the
LegalZoom document is wholly inadequate for the consumer’s needs and
therefore provides no legal protection. 72 Although LegalZoom allows for
“binding arbitration” should disputes prove unresolvable through informal
channels, LegalZoom’s disclaimer largely eviscerates the company’s
liabilities.73 With minimal or no consequences resulting from sub-par legal
instruments and services, LegalZoom has no incentives to ensure accuracy or
quality. If consumers receive products or services from licensed
practitioners, however, regulations prevent attorneys from disclaiming such
liability and therefore attorneys have substantial incentives to ensure
accuracy and quality.74
68

See id. at 854 (“consumers themselves may be misled into thinking that they
have resolved their legal difficulties without realizing that the documents they have paid for
are woefully incomplete”). See also Home Page, LEGALZOOM, www.legalzoom.com
(emphasis added).
69
See Katy Ellen Deady, Cyberadvice: The Ethical Implications of Giving
Professional Advice Over the Internet, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 891, 902 (2001).
70
See supra note 63.
71
See Catherine Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril
and the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 193 (Oct. 1999) (“the nature of disclaimers in cyberspace
may create difficulties in enforcing them, as they may easily be ignored or avoided with the
inadvertent click of a mouse”).
72
See Lanctot, supra note. 56, at 821 (“document preparers [are] largely immune
from liability for their services”).
73
See Home Page Disclaimer, LEGAL ZOOM, www.legalzoom.com/disclaimer.
html (“LegalZoom is not responsible for any loss, injury, claim, liability, or damage related to
your use of this site...whether from errors or omissions in the content of our site… your use of
the site is at your own risk”).
74
Model Rules Prof’l Conduct R.1.8(h)(1) (“[a] lawyer shall not make an
agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice”).
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While the hypothetical harms follow logically from an analysis of
unauthorized practice laws, the empirical data does not support the
conclusion that consumers are harmed when unauthorized persons or entities
practice law. 75 Of 144 unauthorized practice cases reported between 1908
and 1969, only 12 claimed “specific injury.” 76 Only 2% of unauthorized
practice claims are initiated by consumers—the rest are a result of Bar
Committee initiatives.77 Further, it is likely true that many rote and routine
legal services do not require a Juris Doctor to be completed effectively. 78
Allowing para-professionals, such as paralegals, to perform these tasks
lowers costs while still providing quality services. 79 Also, although a
disclaimer of all liability could, in theory, lower quality, consumers will not
use nonlawyers for legal services if the services provided are routinely
insufficient.80 With empirical data to show that consumers are ultimately not
the voice of discontent, unlicensed para-professionals having the ability to
provide quality routine legal services, and market forces ensuring document
and service quality, it is likely LegalZoom is able to avoid the parade of
horribles caused by nonlawyers practicing law predicted by academia.
2. Attorney-Client Privilege
Even licensed attorneys are protected from claims when no attorneyclient privilege is formed.81 Therefore, a prerequisite to holding LegalZoom
liable, in addition to or instead of the liability they may face for practicing
law without a license, is the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Like
unauthorized practice statutes, whether or not an attorney-client relationship
has been formed varies by jurisdiction. However, generally courts draw
75
See Rotenberg, supra note 52, at 724 (“[h]arm resulting from the unauthorized
practice of law is historically overstated”).
76
Id. at 724–25 (citing Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of
Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors - Or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 159, 203 (1980)).
77
Id. (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 43 (1981)).
78
See Roger C. Cramton, Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono: Mandatory Pro
Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113, 1139 (1991) (“[s]even years of higher education is not
required for most repetitive transactions” such as “wills, uncontested divorces, simple
bankruptcies, [and] residential home transactions”).
79
Id. at 1137.
80
See Rotenberg, supra note 52, at 726 (“market forces create strong incentives
for [LegalZoom] to create reliable, cost-efficient,[,] and non-harmful products”) and at 727
(“existing market forces already incentivize consumer protection, while a variety of legal
actions provide significant tools for redress”). See also Underwood, supra note 51, at 464 (“a
demonstrably reliable service does not raise the same concerns” as are normally raised by
nonlawyers practicing law).
81
See Deady, supra note 68, at 896 (discussing that a prerequisite to a legal
malpractice claim is the existence of an attorney-client relationship giving rise to a duty of
care).
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distinctions by gauging the generality of the advice.82 Specifically tailored
advice directed at a present and real legal question ordinarily will give rise to
an attorney-client relationship. 83 An attorney-client relationship can arise
through both explicit and implicit means. 84 Much like LegalZoom’s
disclaimer asserting that LegalZoom is not engaged in the practice of law,
LegalZoom also specifically disclaims the existence of an attorney-client
relationship. 85 LegalZoom warns that “you are and will be representing
yourself in any legal matter you undertake through LegalZoom’s legal
document service.” 86 However, licensed practitioners have also tried to
disclaim attorney-client relationships, often to no avail.87 There is no reason
to assume that courts would disallow attorneys to disclaim such a
relationship but then paradoxically allow LegalZoom to continue the
practice.88
The duty of care imposed on lawyers as a result of forming an
attorney-client relationship protects clients in two important ways, among
others: (1) the relationship ensures loyalty by the attorney to the client, and
(2) the duty gives rise to the important attorney-client privilege.89 As to the
first concern, there is an argument that LegalZoom does not have loyalty to
the client, but rather, to profit.90 Because the well-being of the client is not
82

See Kristine M. Moriarty, Law Practice and the Internet: The Ethical
Implications that Arise From Multijurisdictional Online Legal Service, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 431,
433 (2001) (“[t]he courts have generally drawn the line regarding whether or not a duty exists
by considering the generality of the advice”).
83
Id. at 434. See also Deady, supra note 70, at 898 (“[g]iving legal advice has
been viewed as a hallmark of the attorney-client relationship and the bar has been distinctly
hostile to lawyers answering questions about specific legal issues”).
84
See generally Deady, supra note 70, at 897 (“with legal cyberadvice we are
dealing with an implied attorney-client relationship rather than an explicit contract or
agreement to provide services”).
85
Terms of Use, LEGALZOOM, www.legalzoom.com/legal/general-terms/termsof-use (“LegalZoom does not and will not create an attorney-client relationship between you
and LegalZoom”) (Sept. 3, 2014).
86
Id.
87
See Moriarty, supra note 81, at 434–35 (“[m]any lawyers attempt to . . .
disclaim[] the existence of [an attorney-client relationship] . . . [t]hese disclaimers, however,
are usually unpersuasive to the courts”).
88
See Schindler, supra note 10, at 207–08 (“in other areas of life, providing a
disclaimer is not always enough to disclaim liability—New York and Ohio both have statutes
that void liability disclaimers for parking garages whose employees act negligently in
handling patrons’ cars . . . [w]hile valuable, cars are likely less valuable than the sum of the
estate a person leaves in their will, the handling of which deserves care above a level of
potential negligence”).
89
See id. at 204 n. 124 (the existence of an attorney-client relationship “insure[s]
the loyalty of the lawyer to the client unimpaired by intervening and possibly conflicting
interests.”) (quoting Elliot E. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of
the Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REV. 438, 439 (1965)). See also
Underwood, supra note 51, at 440–41 (“[in] the absence of [the] attorney-client privilege
courts may compel nonlawyers to testify about communications involving their clients”).
90
See Schindler, supra note 10, at 189 (“the motivating factor behind publishing
these tools is profit rather than concern for the public”).
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the main focus of LegalZoom, there is a possibility that LegalZoom’s legal
services will be colored by its own interests and resultantly ill-fitted to the
consumer.91 For example, LegalZoom, in order to realize more revenue, may
try to “up-sell”92 a consumer buying a Last Will by offering a Living Trust.
Notwithstanding the fact that a Living Trust may not be appropriate for that
particular consumer, LegalZoom may encourage its purchase. This sort of
salesmanship is ordinarily not allowed in the law, as the main concern in
such a transaction is the profit of the legal services provider and not the wellbeing of the client.93
As to the second concern, LegalZoom specifically disclaims the
existence of an attorney-client privilege.94 Further, because LegalZoom is not
an attorney, or an attorney’s subordinate, LegalZoom is not covered by the
Rules of Professional Conduct and therefore customers of LegalZoom could
not form an attorney-client relationship. Without the attorney-client
privilege, LegalZoom may be subpoenaed for information relating to one of
its two million customers.95 Imagine a father who leaves all of his money to
his new wife and disinherits his children. During a moment of unhappiness
with his marriage, the father creates an account on LegalZoom in order to
file for an uncontested divorce. After filling out the questionnaire,
LegalZoom sends the divorce documents to the father. The father’s marriage
gets better, he decides not to file for an uncontested divorce, and burns the
documents. Unfortunately, a few months later, the father falls ill and passes
away. The father’s children may claim that the will leaving all the money to
the new wife does not represent the wishes of their now deceased father and,
in order to prove it, could subpoena LegalZoom to prove their father tried to
file for divorce. 96 If that same father had gone to an attorney to prepare
divorce documents, the court, and the children, would be unable to subpoena
the attorney for the same documents because of the attorney-client privilege.
91
See Cramton, supra note 78, at 1125 (“the assistance of lawyers is either
essential or highly advantageous in dealing with court or administrative proceedings . . . [and]
although . . . nonlawyers could handle many routine tasks . . . a . . . person is at a severe
disadvantage if an experienced and able lawyer is representing the opposing interest”).
92
While selling an item, the salesperson attempts to sell a complimentary, but
perhaps unnecessary, item in order to boost sales.
93
Model Rules Prof’l Conduct § 1.7, cmt 1 (“[l]oyalty and independent judgment
are essential… in the lawyer’s relationship with the client… [c]oncurrent conflicts of interest
can arise...from the lawyer’s own interests” and are prohibited). See also Lanctot, supra note
56, at 848 (examining bankruptcy cases and concluding that the negative outcomes in the
cases studied arose from either “misrepresentation or negligence by unscrupulous
entrepreneurs trying to make a quick buck” or “honest lay practitioners, who genuinely
believed they were providing valuable service, [and] made basic errors because of their lack of
adequate training or experience with the complexities of the bankruptcy codes”).
94
LEGALZOOM, www.legalzoom.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2014)
(“[c]ommunications between you and LegalZoom are protected by our Privacy Policy but not
by the attorney-client privilege”).
95
See Rotenberg, supra note 52, at 736.
96
See Underwood, supra note 51 at 441 (“courts may compel nonlawyers to
testify about communications involving their clients”).
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Although the hypotheticals offered above are possible negative
scenarios following from a consumer using LegalZoom, the benefits may
outweigh the costs.97 In the 12 years LegalZoom has been in operation, there
has been little public outcry concerning the inadequacy of LegalZoom
products, other than from practicing attorneys. 98 This lack of public
displeasure would seem to indicate a general satisfaction with the legal
services LegalZoom provides to its consumers. 99 If LegalZoom is able to
provide a minimal level of legal protection to those consumers who cannot
otherwise afford an attorney, or who simply would not otherwise choose to
see an attorney, such services may help prevent some litigation that would
have otherwise occurred had those consumers not turned to LegalZoom. 100
Additionally, it is likely true that some help for otherwise pro se litigants is
better than no help.101 Pro se litigants can be a burden on the court systems
and, with no information whatsoever at their disposal, often do a poor job of
representing themselves.102 Even if not every document or service created
and sold by
LegalZoom is perfect for a particular consumer, for those consumers
who find success using LegalZoom there is no subsequent litigation or, if
there is, the consumers are better prepared to represent themselves, relieving
some of the burden on the court system.

97

See Cramton, supra note 78, at 1128 (“[v]iewed in light of the alternatives–—
no representation or self-representation—the competency problem is overstated”). See also
Richard W. Painter, Symposium on Ethical Issues and Trends in Family Law Pro Se Litigation
in Times of Financial Hardship—A Legal Crisis and Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45, 60 (2011)
(“[l]egal services are a necessity for many people and should be available for persons of
modest means, even if some qualitative sacrifices have to be made and some ethics rules have
to be adjusted”).
98
See LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 1 (May 10, 2012)
(explaining that in the first ten years of operation, LegalZoom surveyed “two million
consumers,” and that in 2011 “nine out of ten of our surveyed customers said they would
recommend LegalZoom to their friends and family” an apparent indication of satisfaction).
See also David A. Hiersekorn, So, What’s So Bad About LegalZoom.com, Anyway?,
www.kctrustlaw.com/files/Download/Legalzoom.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (an account
of the experience of one estate planning lawyer using LegalZoom to create a will and a
documenting of the failures of the will to address his specific needs).
99
See LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement, supra note 97, at 1. But see
Lanctot, supra note 56, at 854 (“we have no way of knowing how courts will react in the
future, when the first dot-com wills are probated or divorce papers are challenged, and turn
out to have been inadequate under the law”).
100
See Rotenberg, supra note 52at 733 (stating LegalZoom may “create a new
preventative market for consumer driven legal services”).
101
See Painter, supra note 97, at 53 (“courts recognize that computerized legal
forms can help pro se litigants and save judges some of the time they spend dealing with
litigants who are unprepared”).
102
See id. at 45 (“litigants are generally doing a poor job of representing
themselves and are burdening the courts”).

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol38/iss1/2

14

Blades: Crying Over Spilt Milk: Why the Legal Community is Ethically Obli

2015]

CRYING OVER SPILT MILK

45

III. THE HIGH PRICE OF LAW
The issue with the organized bar taking actions to enjoin
LegalZoom’s continued existence is that the legal community’s failure to
provide affordable legal services to all those who need legal services has a
long and well-documented history. The bar took notice of this disparity as
early as 1908, and the disparity continues and has grown into this decade.
These next sections explore the past failings of the bar to ensure access to the
justice system, the bar’s recent history and continued failure to provide
access, and potential causes of the vacuum that has been created through
providing the very wealthy and the very poor legal services, with no services
going to those in between.
A. The Past
One of the “Core Principles” of the legal profession is that lawyers
have “an obligation to the public in addition” to an obligation to the client.103
These obligations to the public have justified special privileges given to the
legal profession—such as self-regulation—and manifested in the form of
ideological visions of attorneys committed to the “spirit of public service.”104
“The professional ideal is that each lawyer should strive to make the legal
system live up to its grand promise of equality before and under the law.”105
While this has been the aspiration, the legal profession, in practice,
has fallen short of the ideal. The first code attempting to regulate the ethics
of attorneys made its debut in 1908.106 The codification of the profession’s
duty of “honesty, integrity, and impartial[ity]” was a response to the public’s
perceptions that the legal profession did not serve the public, but rather only
the “wealthy and powerful.”107 However, the members of the American Bar
Association, when drafting the 1908 Canon, believed new attorneys who
charged contingency fees and advertised themselves in order to attract more
business were the source of the image problem.108 And so, the ABA took the
first step of many to limit access for less wealthy individuals by regulating
both contingency fees and advertising.109

103

Christopher J. Whelan, Some Realism About Professionalism: Core Values,
Legality, and Corporate Law Practice, in Enron and Other Corporate Fiascos: The
Corporate Scandal Reader, 813 (Nancy B. Rapoport, et al. ed. 2, 2009).
104
See Cramton, supra note 78, at 1121–22.
105
Id. at 1122.
106
See Douglas L. Colbert, Katrina and the Rule of Law in the Time of Crisis:
Natural Disasters and the Rule of Law in the Time of Crisis: Professional Responsibility in
Crisis, 51 HOW. L.J. 677, 690 (2008).
107
Id. at 690–91.
108
Id. at 695.
109
Id.
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The next attempt to ensure ethical behavior was not until 1969, at the
height of the civil rights movement. 110 Members of the legal community
were aware that colleagues had been part of sophisticated schemes which
helped segregationists skirt the profound new mandates coming out of the
U.S. Supreme Court.111 The movement to supplement and amend the 1908
Canons grew from the ABA’s view that members of the bar were tasked with
a responsibility to “safeguard individual rights.”112 Still, however, the new
Model Code codified a lawyer’s responsibility to “serve the unrepresented”
only as an aspirational goal in the Ethical Considerations rather than a rule
with disciplinary consequences.113
Subsequently, the bar saw many changes. In 1975, the Federal
government established the Legal Services Corporation (LSC)—an
organization that provided publicly funded legal assistance to indigent
clients.114 Many law school graduates entering the workforce in the 1960s
and 1970s were committed to public service and were seeking employment
with organizations that provided legal aid to the poor.115 By 1980, the Legal
Services Corporation was at its apex, employing 6,000 attorneys.116 Parallel
to this expansion of legal aid services in the U.S. was the expansion and
establishment of “elite” law firms.117 The 1980s also saw the largest surge in
the elite law firm arena—the growth rate prior to 1975 holding at 5% and
jumping to 8% after 1975.118

110
Id. at 697 (“Changing the legal profession’s view toward regulating members’
ethical conduct rarely occurs in a historical vacuum… virtually every change in… practice…
reflects… prevailing political and social forces operating in the period of reform”).
111
Id. at 700.
112
See Colbert, supra note 106, at 698.
113
Id. at 702.
114
See Cramton, supra note 78, at 1118.
115
Colbert, supra note 106, at 704–05.
116
See Cramton, supra note 78, at 1118.
117
See Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic
Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
1, 10–11 (2011). “Elite law firms” (also often referred to as “Big Law”) are most notable for
their size, structure, and clientele. Id. at 8–10. Although employing more attorneys than
traditionally would be part of firms in the 1960s, elite law firms were notable for the small
number of partners at the top with many “lesser” attorneys working under them. Id. at 9. The
structure was bureaucratic, with the marching orders coming from the senior partners and the
majority of the substantive work completed by the junior associates. Id. at 23–25. Elite law
firms dealt primarily, if not exclusively, with “captains of industry,” the large corporations
and the wealthy entrepreneurs. Id. at 8.
118
See Burk & McGowan, supra note 117 at 11–12. While only thirty-eight firms
in the U.S. had more than fifty lawyers in the 1950s, there was an astonishing 508 firms with
more than fifty lawyers in the 1980s, and there were more than 250 law firms employing 100
or more attorneys. Id. This expansion in the number of attorneys employed by elite law firms
tracked the expansion of elite law firms into multiple jurisdictions, rather than the “single
city” model of the 1960s. Id. at 12.
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B. The Present
In 1983, the Kutak Commission of the ABA redrafted the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct into the version with which the lawyers
currently in practice are familiar.119 Due to an increasing understanding that
pro bono service is an ethical duty of the legal profession, the Commission
attempted to codify a mandatory pro bono requirement into the Code.120 This
measure was met with strong support and equally strong resistance.121 The
result was the Commission’s ultimate adoption of Rule 6.1,”[e]very lawyer
has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to
pay . . . a lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono…
services per year.”122 Again, the ideal of lawyers dedicated to public service
remained an aspiration, without being required.123
Meanwhile, elite law firms became bigger and made more money. 124
The 250 largest law firms in the U.S. in 2008 employed, on average, 535
attorneys.125 The average salary for a first year law associate in an elite law
firm in 2007 was $160,000 and the average salary for equity partners in the
100 most profitable firms was $1.3 million.126 This increase in salary amount
correlated with a rise in the cost of the billable hour. In 2007, elite law firms
were charging clients $200-$300 an hour for first year associate work. 127
During this same year, while money spent on non-LSC funding grew to $753
million, only about $375 million was spent on the LSC. 128 In 2009, “the
United States continued to rank last among peer nations in government
support for legal aid.”129
C. The Vacuum
With elite law firms serving the very rich, and legal aid
organizations serving the very poor, a vacuum is created for middle- and
low-income individuals who need (or want) access to the justice system but
do not qualify for assistance and cannot afford attorneys.130 For example, in
119

Colbert, supra note 106, at 707.
Id. at 710.
121
Id. at 711.
122
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 6.1 (2013) (emphasis added); see also
Colbert, supra note 106, at 707.
123
Colbert, supra note 106, at 712.
124
Burk & McGowan, supra note 117, at 12.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 13–14, 21.
127
Id. at 22. Some equity partners were making as much as $1,000 per hour during
this same year. Id.
128
See Jeanne Charn, Legal Services for All: Is the Profession Ready?, 42 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1030 (2009).
129
Id. at 1022.
130
Id. at 1045 (“[w]e have had a nearly exclusive focus on the very poor at the
expense of middle-income people who also cannot afford traditional market-rate lawyer
120
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1994 the ABA reported that 61% of people with moderate incomes that
needed legal assistance never actually accessed the justice system.131 While
most lawyers do participate in pro bono, participation is often self-serving
and generally does not help to ameliorate the barriers to access. 132
Additionally, although the recession decreased salaries of incoming
associates and partners in elite law firms, the price of the services in those
firms still increased, placing those services further from reach for low- and
middle-income individuals.133 So now the questions is this: When members
of the bar generally agree that the legal community has an ethical duty to
serve those who are unrepresented, when lawyers in both practice and
academia are intently aware of low- and middle-income persons lack of
access to the justice system, and with the recession threatening the previous
elite law firm model, why has the legal profession failed to fill this vacuum?
Three theories are pervasive.
1. Monopoly
First, lawyers have a monopoly over legal services.134 Each state, and
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, forbid unlicensed persons from
providing legal services.135 In this environment, individuals must either risk
representing themselves or seek the services of an attorney. 136 With no
competition, there can be little coercive pressure to reduce costs. 137 “The
autonomy of law is . . . that of an institution that can establish its own values
. . . without pressure to take into account an important value for participants
services”); see also Cramton, supra note 78, at 1116, 1119 (“[t]hose who want lawyers and
are able to pay for them have little difficulty finding reasonably competent professional
services”) and (“[t]he working poor, and large portions of the middle class, encounter
problems in selecting and paying for lawyers”).
131
See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 960 (2000).
132
See Cramton, supra note 78, at 1124. (“much of [the time spent on pro bono] is
directed toward activities that build relations with other lawyers, such as bar association work,
or work that is designed to attract clients, such as free or reduced-rate work for local charities”
explaining this is so because Model Rule 6.1 gives many options to fulfill pro bono duties, not
limited to helping those that cannot afford representation). See Hadfield, supra note 131, at
960 (Another study done by the ABA in 1990 found that 52% of divorces were obtained
without attorneys and 88% of family cases litigated had at least one party with no
representation or one party who failed to appear.)
133
See Burk & McGowan, supra note 117, at 33 (“[m]any large firms… reduced
entering associates’ salaries by 10–20% with similar reductions up the line in the more senior
classes”). See also id. at 36 (“many large firms announced increases in their… standard…
rates in early 2009 and again in early 2010” although the increases were “more modest” than
in previous years).
134
See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 78, at 1126; Hadfield, supra note 125, at 954;
Schindler, supra note 10, at 187. See also supra Part III.C.1.
135
See supra Part III.C.1. See also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5 (2013).
136
See Hadfield, supra note 131, at 993.
137
Id.
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in the system: the cost of participating.”138 In addition to a monopoly over
the actual service, lawyers also generally hold a monopoly over the
information needed to effectively resolve a legal issue. 139 This monopoly
over information results in consumers having little coercive pressure to
reduce costs because consumers do not have the tools to readily valuate legal
services. 140 Some members of the profession believe the monopoly is
precisely the reason that lawyers have an affirmative duty to provide legal
services for free, or at reduced rates.141
2. Greed
A second theory for why legal services are unaffordable is because
lawyers are greedy.142 What the public perceives as greedy is often translated
in legal academia as the tension between the law as a profession and the law
as a business.143 As a professional, a lawyer serves the public as well as the
client. 144 As a businessperson, a lawyer serves the bottom line. 145 When
money is the motivating factor behind representation, lawyers become
138

Id.
Id. at 985–92 (discussing “natural barriers of entry” into the legal market—
legal education, practical experience, and a cognitive ability to engage in complex reasoning).
140
Victor E. Schwartz, et al., Consumer Protection in the Legal Marketplace: A
Legal Consumer’s Bill of Rights Is Needed, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (“[t]he
result is that consumers may not have all the information they need to make an educated
decision when choosing either an attorney or a payment plan for legal fees . . . most
consumers do not know the value of a claim, how much work and skill will be needed for the
attorney to pursue it, or its chance of success . . . [c]onsequently a consumer may be
overcharged for legal services”).
141
See Cramton, supra note78, at 1126 (“[L]awyers have a special responsibility
to provide legal assistance to the poor because of the profession’s… its monopoly of legal
services.”).
142
See Hadfield, supra note 131, at 954 (when discussing reasons why the price of
law is so high, Hadfield asserts that popular culture believes it is because “lawyers are an
avaricious lot who will bleed you dry”); See also Jessica J. Sage, Authority of the Law? The
Contribution of Secularized Legal Education to the Moral Crisis of the Profession, 31 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 707, 707–08 (2004) (“[O]ver the last century the study of law has undergone a
significant transformation and earned itself a reputation amongst the public as one of being
unethical and greedy.”).
143
See David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability Forces
to Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practice for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
203, 205 (2004) (“[I]n a system in which law practice is a business, if it does not cost the
business itself any money it doesn’t matter… making a motion that a judge calls ‘stupid’ isn’t
a problem, because if the client can pay the freight, you have created more billable hours to
pad the bottom line… as a business person, if it does not cost you it is simply not real.”)
(emphasis added).
144
See Whelan, supra note 103, at 813 (“lawyers have been called upon to be
professional—entailing some public service ideal—despite also making a living”).
145
See Barnhizer, supra note 143, at 232 (“We have increasingly seen the
assertion that law practice should be viewed as a business activity run for profit rather than a
principled profession in which lawyers are obligated to behave in a higher and more ethical
manner.”).
139
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beholden to their clients or may engage in bill padding, resulting in the
appearance of, or actual, greed.146
3. Market
Market forces are more likely than monopoly or greed, however, to
be driving prices up. 147 The legal market “is characterized by a bidding
competition between commercial actors and individuals for access to scarce
legal resources.” 148 In addition, the practice of law is difficult and
complex. 149 The complexity and difficulty of law results in high costs
because it takes a lot of effort and time for a lawyer to resolve even the most
benign legal matter effectively and with enough due diligence to satisfy the
requirements of Model Rule 1.3.150 When wealthy corporate and individual
clients are competing for the same resources as low- or middle-income
individuals, more resources will inevitably be allocated to the wealthy client
as it is the wealthy client that will be able to adequately compensate the
attorney for the amount of work devoted to the legal issue.151 This allocation
of resources distorts the price of legal services, allowing the corporate and
wealthy clients to determine the pricing mechanism for all legal services.152
IV. THE SOLUTION
Lawyers have had opportunities to fix the disparities in the provision
of legal services and have failed to take meaningful action.153 One of the first
chances was in 1908, when the bar was aware of the public perception that
lawyers were beholden to the wealthiest in society.154 Instead of making it
easier for attorneys to represent clients for free, on a contingency basis, and
therefore increasing access, the bar stifled attorneys’ ability to contract with
clients for this fee arrangement. 155 Then in 1969, when ideals of public
service and access to justice for all were pervasive within the profession, the
ABA took the conservative approach.156 Instead of capitalizing on the public
service spirit of the 1960s and 1970s by including a duty of mandatory pro
bono hours, the ideal of legal services for the unrepresented remained an
146

See Whelan, supra note 103, at 853; see also Barnhizer, supra note 143, at 231.
See Hadfield, supra note 131, at 998.
148
Id. at 956.
149
Id. at 965–67. Complex not only because of the intricacies involved but also
because of the schooling required to practice.
150
Id. at 969. See also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (diligence).
151
Hadfield, supra note 131, at 973.
152
Id. at 998 (“[i]t is the wealth of the business client group that ultimately
determines the pricing in the markets for lawyers… the legal system prices itself out of reach
of all individuals except those with a claim on corporate wealth”).
153
See supra notes 108–129 and accompanying text.
154
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
155
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
156
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
147
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aspiration. 157 By the time the Kutak Commission undertook to revise the
Model Code, it was too late for mandatory pro bono hours.158 The idea of
mandatory pro bono service divided the legal community and the ABA
faltered at such strong opposition. 159 Furthermore, despite what the ABA
could have done to force lawyers to fulfill the public service ideal, attorneys
did not take it upon themselves to fulfill the promise of providing legal
services to all who needed it.160
Whether the price of law remains high because a monopoly insulates
attorneys from outside pressure to lower costs, the sheer greed of bar
members, or because noncompetitive market forces skew the cost of legal
services high when corporations and low- and middle-income individuals
compete for the same resources, the vacuum remains.161 LegalZoom provides
needed access to the legal system that attorneys have been otherwise unable
(or unwilling) to fulfill. 162 The services provided by LegalZoom are often
characterized as “routine” or “common” legal services.163 While LegalZoom
does not guarantee accuracy or completeness, and warns consumers that the
company does not provide legal representation, consumers are willing to
forgo the protections provided by traditional legal services in exchange for
minimal legal protections. 164 Even if consumers are fully aware that
LegalZoom does not guarantee protection of legal rights, consumers know
that something is better than nothing.165 Furthermore, for those consumers
whose legal issues are completely resolved by purchasing a document or
service from LegalZoom, the company relieves some of the strain already
placed on resources of licensed attorneys.166 In addition to relieving the strain
on legal resources, adequate services provided by LegalZoom act as
preventative measures. 167 Consumers that might have otherwise needed to
journey through probate or family court may have resolved their legal issues
through LegalZoom and never need the court system.168 Thus, to the extent
that LegalZoom’s services adequately meet consumer need, the justice
system is not burdened by pro se litigants.169
Consumers, academics, and some regulators have already recognized
these benefits. 170 Most of the criticism pointed at LegalZoom stems from
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

See supra note 122, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 124–126 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text.
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134–151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52–53, 53, 85, 99–102 and accompanying text.
See supra note 99–102 and accompanying text.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 21–25, 47–51 and accompanying text.
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licensed attorneys—not the public. 171 Alarm about LegalZoom by legal
professionals has garnered little sympathy from the public that has been
otherwise forgotten by these same professionals. 172 This support for
LegalZoom by consumers, paired with the academic harms (as opposed to
empirical harms) LegalZoom may cause, is strong evidence that LegalZoom
will survive the critics. 173 Moreover, LegalZoom should survive. For too
long the legal community has underserved the population that LegalZoom
aims to serve.174 Therefore, it is the legal community’s ethical obligation to
ensure access to the justice system that the bar has been unable to provide is
provided through services like LegalZoom. While LegalZoom will and
should survive attacks by the organized bar, the nature of the service does
pose legitimate threats to consumer interests. 175 However, these threats do
not need to mean the end of LegalZoom. Rather, states should act to regulate
LegalZoom through licensure requirements, disclosures which are thorough
and conspicuous, and clearly defined unauthorized practice statutes.
A. Licensure
Though there have not been consumer complaints regarding the
quality of LegalZoom’s documents or services, states should adopt measures
which hold LegalZoom to a higher duty than their current standard of caveat
emptor.176 Although market forces should ensure that LegalZoom provides
quality services, lest consumers stop using the site, by creating licenses for
nonlawyers and nonlawyer entities states could provide incentives with more
bite than mere customer disapproval. 177 Theoretically attorneys could be

171

See supra notes 27–30, 77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98–99.
173
See supra notes 21, 36, 47–51, 76–78, and accompanying text; see also
Lanctot, supra note 56, at 853 (“[W]e must consider the ramifications of [enforcing
unauthorized practice of law statutes against LegalZoom]. The public reaction would likely be
negative. Enforcing unauthorized practice of law statutes against online document preparation
services would be neither painless nor popular. The lay public, which already detests lawyers,
generally perceives unauthorized practice of law enforcement as yet another way for the legal
profession to line its collective pockets at the expense of consumers. In addition, it is at least
possible that these websites are managing to provide some consumers with a necessary
service—basic legal documents at an affordable price. At a time when the bar seems to have
abdicated its responsibility to provide routine, noncomplex legal services to the poor and
middle class, it could well be counterproductive to try to shut down one vehicle for serving
those unmet needs.”).
174
See supra notes 3, 109–129 and accompanying text.
175
See supra notes 53, 66–74, 91, 94–96 and accompanying text.
176
See supra notes 53, 86 and accompanying text.
177
See Hadfield, supra note 131, at 1004 (“the boundaries of the profession…
are… a matter of institutional and deliberate choice… in theory… it is quite possible to
conceive of a different set of boundaries… over time, [there could be] the development of
professional identities, degrees, training, and practices [in the legal system] that become as
distinct from each other as… those of the M.B.A. and the M.S.W.”). See also Painter, supra
172
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regulated by the marketplace as well—after all, attorneys are also in the
business of providing quality services to consumers. However, through
licensing, state bar associations and state supreme courts are able to ensure
attorneys comply with a higher level of care and diligence than salespeople
of other services. 178 Although consumers turning to LegalZoom are
necessarily choosing low-cost over high-quality, it does not follow that states
should wholly protect consumers in one arena–when consumers use licensed
attorneys–and wholly ignore consumer protection in the other arena–when
consumers use LegalZoom.179 Nor does it make sense to deprive consumers
of quality affordable alternatives to licensed attorneys. Through licensing,
and therefore regulating, the services provided by LegalZoom, states can
provide greater access to the justice system while still ensuring “correct,
complete, [and] up-to-date” forms and services that aim to actually and
accurately fulfill consumer needs.180
B. Disclosure
Texas courts have already recognized the need for “clear and
conspicuous” disclosures. 181 The most palatable threat LegalZoom has to
consumer interests is misleading the public into believing that LegalZoom is
an equivalent replacement for the services of an attorney. 182 When consumers
buy “personalized, affordable legal protection” with a “100% satisfaction
guarantee,” they may not understand that LegalZoom cannot guarantee the
documents will be enforceable if tested in litigation.183 The warnings in the
fine print at the bottom of the home page that LegalZoom does not represent
the customer’s interests, hidden in the text of the overwhelmingly long
Terms of Use, and relegated to the inconspicuous Disclaimer, does not
provide the consumer an accurate understanding of what they are trading by
choosing LegalZoom instead of an attorney. 184 Well-informed consumers
should be allowed to accept responsibility for a failed legal document and
waive their right to place that responsibility on the legal services provider in
exchange for paying lower costs–but the key language is well informed.185
note 97, at 60 (“[o]rganizations that provide low-cost legal services… should be subject to
state licensure and regulation of their services”).
178
See supra notes 60, 74, 138 and accompanying text.
179
See Charn, supra note 128, at 1048 (guaranteeing access to the justice system
through nonlawyers “will require an examination of cost and quality trade-offs among
different modes of service delivery”).
180
See supra notes 66–74 and accompanying text.
181
See supra note 50.
182
See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
183
See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
184
See supra notes 53, 86 and accompanying text.
185
See Underwood, supra note 51, at 467 (“[c]ourts should require that
nonlawyers disclose this risk to clients at the outset of the relationship… [n]onlawyers could
satisfy this requirement by way of a written disclaimer, provided the disclaimer is
unambiguous and is shown to all clients prior to use of the product or service… [i]f consumers
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Licensing of nonlawyer legal services, as mentioned above, would be able to
regulate entities like LegalZoom in order to approve and monitor adequate
disclosure.
C. Clear Definitions
As time has proven, the legal community cannot provide the
necessary services to all those who need it. 186 As holders of the keys to
access, it is incumbent upon the ABA and states to allow for services like
LegalZoom to flourish and do what licensed attorneys have been unable to
do. 187 In order for LegalZoom to succeed, however, states must adopt
definitions of “practice of law” that are clear and concise. Without an
adequate definition of what it is the legal community wants to prevent
nonlawyers from doing, LegalZoom will continuously be under threat of
class actions by bar associations looking to villainize LegalZoom’s
apparently harmless unauthorized practice of law. 188 The legal community
has failed to provide services for low- and middle-income individuals, and
created a vacuum by providing services for the very wealthy and the very
poor. It would be unethical for the legal community to continue to deprive
these individuals of services by allowing LegalZoom to fail because of the
uncertainty in current definitions of “the practice of law.”
V. CONCLUSION
LegalZoom does what the bar, thus far, has been unable to do. The
online form provider brings legal aid to those who cannot otherwise afford it.
It provides a means for low-income entrepreneurs to start a business, for
those with a smaller nest-egg to ensure it is taken care of if the worst
happens, and for moderate-income families to navigate the legalities of love
and love lost. While LegalZoom is not without its critics, a whopping 2
million business and personal users, $12 million net income in 2012, plus
little to no outcry from its users proves that LegalZoom is a valid alternative
to high-priced lawyers. And while the high price of law cannot be blamed
exclusively on attorneys themselves, nor on the monopoly attorneys hold in
the legal services market, nor the greed so often associated in the media with
the profession of law, nor other market factors such as the enormous cost of
law school, there remains a vacuum in the legal services market: a vacuum
that leaves those with low- to middle-incomes without legal services.
LegalZoom fills that vacuum. Attempts to fill the vacuum, while noble, have
failed to completely address the legal services gap. And while consumer
solicit a nonlawyer’s services after reading the disclaimer, then they are presumed to have
impliedly consented to the lack of privilege”).
186
See supra notes 106–133 and accompanying text.
187
See supra notes 134–141 and accompanying text.
188
See supra notes 32, 38–46, 54–57 and accompanying text.
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protection is a laudable goal, the milk is spilt and we must now find a way to
clean it up—LegalZoom is the answer.
It is no longer appropriate for attorneys to bring suits against
LegalZoom for phantom harms caused by LegalZoom’s unauthorized
practice of law. Consumers are demanding access to legal services, and
LegalZoom is making such access available. The legal community has
spoken repeatedly throughout history about a duty that each attorney has to
provide services to those that cannot otherwise afford them. Although this
ideal has not been met by the legal community, LegalZoom provides an
alternative that is working. To block access to legal services because of
something as amorphous as “practice of law” statutes is to effectively deny
access to legal services to those whom the legal community has neglected: a
miscarriage of justice and a failure of the profession’s ethical obligations.
Therefore, the organized bar is ethically obligated to ensure LegalZoom’s
continuation through changes to current regulations.
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